Indigenous conflict resolution mechanism in Gilgit-Baltistan Research Journal By : Ashiq Hussain

Indigenous conflict resolution mechanism in Gilgit-Baltistan

Research Journal By : Ashiq Hussain 
(Lecture, School of politics and international studies KIU)

A B S T R A C T 

The purpose of this study is to explore the contribution of elders in the GilgitBaltistan community in resolving disputes. Qualitative survey data was collected through interviews with Jirgadar/elders and conflicting parties. It was found that councils of elders, or jirgas, have successfully resolved various conflicts and prevented potential conflicts from escalating, thereby restoring harmony and saving people from losses in terms of lives and money. However, the role of local mechanisms has been limited to some areas and cases. The weak role of these mechanisms is due to a lack of government support and the weakening of trust between local elders and the community. The article concludes that local methods of dispute resolution should be encouraged to reduce the burden of litigation and save conflicting parties from mental suffering and financial implications. Therefore, the government should support the local system and the community needs to build trust in the indigenous mechanism of conflict resolution.

Introduction 

Conflict resolution mechanism at the local level; outside of legal branches of government, by elders of the community referred to as "Alternative Dispute Resolution" (ADR). These processes of dispute resolution occur outside of any governmental authority through methods of mediation, arbitration, conciliation and negotiations by elders of the local community (Cornell, 2024). All these methods have similar characteristics enabling the parties to reach admissible solutions to conflicts outside of governmental legal and court proceedings. However, ADRs are governed by various rules developed over the ages by local traditions and customary rules. For example, in arbitration, a third-party decision is bound to be followed by aggrieved parties or conflicting individuals or groups. Arbitrators are given the authority to reach any conclusion to resolve disputes once and for all. Their decisions are binding on disputing or conflicting parties and they need to obey the decision whatsoever the consequences may be upon them. Contrary to arbitration, the purpose of a third party in mediation and conciliation is to promote an amicable agreement between parties but their decision is not binding. In negotiations, there is no role of a third party rather disputing parties try to resolve their issue by engaging themselves in dialogues with each other.

 Gilgit-Baltistan, like many parts of third world countries, experiences a mixture of a colonial-inspired justice system and a traditional local dispute resolution mechanism. This dispute resolution system can be termed as a “fabric of pluralism” (Aiyedun, 2020) where both colonial structures of judicial mechanism and local methods of dispute resolution work together simultaneously. Recognizing the effectiveness of indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms, the government of Pakistan established the office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) through Order 1983 introduced the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism and subsequent Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act 2013 provides a comprehensive document on procedures of ADR (Ombudsmen, 2013). The establishment of ADR was initially extended by opening offices in larger cities e.f Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar etc. However, the establishment of such an office in Gilgit, the capital of Gilgit-Baltistan is yet awaited. However, courts of law in GilgitBaltistan recognize resolutions reached by local Jirgas and courts dispose of the cases sooner courts are formally informed about such agreed-upon resolution by local Jirga. Most of the cases mediated by elders of the community are resolved before reaching to court of law and in case of prior registration of the case and subsequent resolution by community elders, cases are withdrawn from courts by disputing parties presenting a deed of agreement. The effectiveness of indigenous mechanisms in conflict resolution or Alternative Dispute Resolution can be seen in the fact that both civil and criminal nature disputes in various regions of Gilgit-Baltistan have been resolved over time successfully. To dissect this issue in complete depth, this research paper is divided into three parts: the first part elaborates on the nature of disputes/conflicts that frequently arise. The second part discusses local mechanisms and institutional provisions that safeguard these local bodies. The third part consists of some case studies where the local Jirga system has successfully resolved the conflicts satisfying disputing parties.

 Nature of disputes and their magnitude 

The land is often a hotly contested issue in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). Since its occupation by the British in the 19th Century, land laws in GB evolved in pluralist nature practising local traditional, Islamic and British law. Ownership of land transcends from inheritance at the individual level and from the community to the state level. Individual, community and state shape a triangular ownership transfer pattern more prone to confusion, and subjective interpretation marked by occupation, violence and conflict. Several conflicts occur ranging from disputes within families over inheritance and distribution of barren lands or plots among communities. Acquisition of land for state institutions, infrastructures and public properties from individuals and communities may also result in litigation in formal courts. Family disputes over the inheritance of land and demarcation of boundaries in common lands between communities are referred to local Jirgas in many cases. Customary law's success depends on Jirga members or elders of the communities who by their social acumen reach to amicable resolution. This local traditional practice is based on restorative justice in criminal cases and compensatory in civil matters. However, there are certain numbers of criminal and civil cases executed by the informal system while a huge number of cases are lodged in formal courts. Reaching to decision of a formal court takes considerable time and an exhausting process of evidence presentation and counterarguments by contesting parties, these decisions are often challenged by losing parties at higher courts. Hence a new start of proceedings of the same case decided by a district court prolongs in session and high courts. Sometimes such cases continue for twenty or thirty years without reaching a satisfactory decision. The Indigenous Jirga system does not prolong cases and tries to resolve the conflict as soon as possible.

The magnitude of land conflicts can be seen in terms of disputes within families, between communities and state versus individuals and communities. These disputes turn into violent conflicts resulting in the murder of family members, clashes between contesting communities and small and large-scale violent conflicts with state institutions. Family inheritance laws are derived from Islamic Shariah and formal courts refer to the same laws in such cases. Meanwhile, religious ulemas/leaders try to decide such cases outside of the courts in the form of Jirga of elders. Disputes over barren lands or common lands between communities are decided through local traditional laws and English laws by local Jirgas or formal courts. Disputes between state and individuals or communities are frequently referred to formal courts where acquisition and compensation grants for certain pieces of land are decided. Land acquisition laws at formal courts are purely English laws especially those introduced during the early colonial period. Khalsa Sarkar rules which give ownership of common lands of communities to the state are mostly contested laws in GB (Khan, 2023). Majorly three broad types of land disputes and three major sources of law give shape to a Triangular dispute and legal framework so complicated as to difficult to reach any satisfying conclusion. These ambiguous structures of disputes and laws give vent to grievances coupled with emotions resulting in bloody conflicts. Many cases of murder at the family level, community level and against state institutions have been reported. Solutions for such cases have also been sought through local Jirga, at formal courts and in some cases in collaboration with both Jirga and formal courts.

 A close relevant dispute over land is water in GB. Although the region abounds the world's largest natural water reservoirs and flowing streams and rivers yet, poor and traditional water management has been a source of potential conflict between communities and families. Water for irrigation is transported through water channels from streams and rivers to valleys. The capacity of these water channels is limited compared to the size and requirement of irrigated land. To meet this difference, villagers have distributed water in channels in a proportionate manner to fulfil the need for water for irrigation. The method of division of water is age-old and it's unwritten and practised law in most of the villages of GB. In the early harvesting season starting from February and March each year, water flow in channels reduces due to freezing weather in January and December. Lack of water flow in early harvest increases demand for water by villagers and for this reason, they manage the division of stream water. However, this management faces challenges with the increase in the number of households and irrigation lands with time. Conflicts over the distribution of water in channels have been a potential source of conflicts in GB. There are numerous examples where families have fought with each other for long periods. Different villages that share the same flowing streams and water channels have also contested violently over the distribution of water. Indigenous traditional practices are considered to be the main source of law in such cases while Shariah law and English law are less preferred in most cases. Therefore, the resolution of such types of disputes is carried out successfully by local Jirga and this mechanism holds an important position in resolving conflicts related to water issues in GB. In the third section of this paper, case studies presented elaborate some important cases and their final solution which sheds light on the importance of traditional law and the success of the Jirga system.

Apart from land disputes, marriage laws and traditions have also been a source of conflict for people in GB. Formal courts and local Jirgas simultaneously play their role in resolving such kinds of disputes. Marriage is purely a religious domain and hence Shariah Laws are followed in these cases. However, violation of these laws and deviance from local traditions in some cases results in murder, violent clashes and prolonged disputes among families. Contradiction between local traditions, Shariah laws and English laws of marriage, divorce and custody of minors are Research Journal of Human and Social Aspects 23 major causes that escalate disputes to violence and murders. Similarly, marriage across sects is another potential source of conflict in GB (Karishma , Adeela Rehman , Hina Arooj , Nadia Bakhtawar, 2021) arises due to contradictory interpretations of Shariah Law, local prejudices and sectarian hatred. Formal courts and local Jirga simultaneously resolve such issues. However, proceedings in formal courts are more prone to eruption of violence between conflicting parties. Local Jirga often plays an effective role in these cases and their decisions have in some cases mitigated successfully. The influence of violent religion and sects overtrump local traditions and respect for families across different sects. Sectarian clashes divide the indigenous society of GB multiplying the magnitude of conflicts time and again. However, the local Jirga system and indigenous dispute resolution mechanism have succeeded in resolving violent sectarian clashes and saved many individuals and communities from the devastating effects of these clashes. Formal court laws execute such cases under punitive decisions while local Jirga has been found restorative in its nature and hence, more stable and enduring settlements of such disputes come from informal dispute resolution in GB.

 The importance and need to strengthen conflict resolution mechanisms at the indigenous level is evident from the fact that the number of cases resolved by this informal system is considerably high throughout GB. There are various attempts on the part of individuals and communities to strengthen these resolution mechanisms and most of them come from religious centers. Shia Imamia council has organized central Anjuman at Gilgit and Skardu where religious scholars (Ulemas), elders of the community and influential individuals of civil society play their role. Similarly, Shia Imamia Ismaili Councils have more organized mechanisms to resolve conflicts in their communities. Religious centers in various villages known as Jammat Khanas play an important role in mediation and conflict resolution. In Sunni dominated areas, the local Jirga system is prevalent and more effective, particularly in parts of the Dimer region. Sometimes resolution of conflicts takes place across these sectarian groups where local arrangements carry out important role in resolving different natures of disputes. It is unanimously accepted that indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms have been successful in cases where formal courts have been reluctant to present their verdicts. Similarly, conflicting parties show more reliance on the Jirga system and adhere to pronouncements while formal courts lack people's confidence in them. It is evident from the fact that some conflicting parties have attempted to murder their opponents on the premises of courts when presented for hearings by law enforcement agencies. Such murder cases pose serious questions over the safety of arrested individuals on the part of the state. There is an evident need for a collaborative mechanism on the part of the state and society to strengthen indigenous mechanisms. The state courts and law enforcement agencies need to acknowledge the role of community elders, and Jirga members and extend legal and institutional covering to make their role more effective. Institutional safeguards to promote indigenous conflict resolution mechanism

A prominent Jirgadar Ghulam Murtaza popularly known as “Pakistan” from Haramosh village of Gilgit District is reported to have had an informal conversation with an Honorable Ex. judge of Chief Court GB in his house. Pakistan has asked from Judge how many murder cases he had disposed of during his tenure and how much he had been paid for each month in salary. The Ex. Judge had replied that his salary was five hundred thousand and he had disposed of four murder cases in three years. Upon hearing these figures, Pakistan has replied "Isn't it true that the government is blind for it has deputed a man like you who can resolve only a few cases in three years against hundreds of thousands of salaries for each month. Look at me, I claim nothing from the government and have been able to resolve one hundred and three murder cases and this government do not appoint me as judge of any court”. The judge may have looked upon Pakistan  and laughed at Pakistan for not being a law graduate and aspiring to become a judge. There are numerous personalities like Ghulam Murtaza (nickname Pakistan) who voluntarily offer their services to resolve conflicts of various natures in different families and among various communities. Anyhow, this little conversation explicitly explains the importance of the informal resolution of disputes by indigenous mechanisms. This mechanism saves many from losses in terms of money, time and life. Considering this important role played by Indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, the government of Pakistan extends the Informal Resolution of Disputes (IRD) mechanism to institutionalize and safeguard these notables and Jirgadars. 

The IRD concept attracts many of us because it offers inexpensive, expeditious and convenient services for resolving disputes. Local elders of the community through the force of their moral character, social role and indigenous wisdom resolve complicated disputes in their societies. Most people especially from lower strata of society prefer to approach Jirga compared to formal judicial systems involving lengthy legal processes and heavy charges by councils. Article 33 of PO 1 of 1983 provides for the resolution of disputes through mediation and conciliation at the community level (Ombudsmen, 2013). More recently in 2022, Wafaqi Mohtasib has decided to strengthen the scope of IRD to benefit the common citizen of Pakistan by establishing a pilot project at the head office in Islamabad and regional offices at Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta, Multan, Bahawalpur, Abbottabad and D.I. Khan. Representatives of Wafaqi Mohtasib at regional offices will have the authority to informally conciliate, amicably resolve, stipulate or ameliorate any grievance presented by any citizen according to Article 33 of the 1983 Presidential Order and Reforms Act 2013. Clause 2 of Article 33 provides that "the Mohtasib may appoint for purposes of liaison counsellors, whether honorary or otherwise, at local levels on such terms and condition as the Mohtasib may deem proper”. On successful completion of the first pilot project, a second project was to be initiated. It seems that Local Jirga or Panchayet backed by a state institution like Wafaqi Mohtasib would perform smartly in conciliating disputes mainly of middle-class people in Pakistan. Extension of the regional office of Wafaqi Mohtasib at GB would be a better decision and its effectiveness would surely depend upon the appointment of liaison counsellors. Persons like Pakistan have already served this nation voluntarily for many years. They have been successful in resolving high-magnitude conflicts involving fifty murders in a single enmity. 

 It is important to mention here that the concept of ADR introduced by Wafaqi Mohtasib is in line with the indigenous Jirga system of GB. ADR provides for binding and non-binding decisions of resolution. Negotiation, mediation and conciliation are non-binding while a decision at arbitration is binding upon conflicting parties. Similarly, in the Jirga system led by Ghulam Murtaza (Pakistan), conflicting parties are approached if they give their full consent to Jirga for acceptance of a decision of any sort. Another form of consent may only be given to negotiating and Jirga will only present their solution which will not be binding but if contesting parties deem it feasible they can accept. Arbitration is referred to as Chatikoti rai in the local language which means blind acceptance of the decision of Jirga. Conflicting parties once agreed to Jirga for resolution cannot deviate. In most of the cases, the Jirga members start with negotiation, mediation and conciliation and eventually try to get consent for arbitration. Similarly, there are mandatory processes and voluntary processes similar to judicial systems. ADR process and the Jirga system both provide for these processes and they give weightage to the will of parties. The success of ADR is dependent on Jirgadars as mentioned earlier; therefore, the establishment of an office at GB will encourage jirgadars like Pakistan to play their role under institutional purview and recognition.

Case studies 

To ascertain the success of the ADR or Indigenous dispute resolution mechanism, a group of students was assigned the task of interviewing family members or community members of their villages who have been involved in any conflict resolved outside formal courts with the help of local notables or Jirgadars. Some important cases are referred hereunder which solidify the claim that ADR mechanisms are effective and trustworthy in the context of GB. 

1. Domdass Dispute: Nagar v/s Hunza 

Domdass is a piece of hilly land partly consisting of pastures and partly barren land situated between the villages of Nagar and Hunza. Historically, shepherds from both villages with their flocks ascend for grazing up to the top without claiming permanent rights. However, a dispute occurred when some people of Hunza initiated a cemetery claiming permanent rights. The people of Nagar voiced against and termed this act as the permanent occupation of land. Government officials intervened but failed to reach any settlement. Recognizing the need for a peaceful resolution, community elders from both sides convened a Jirga to settle the issue. After consistent deliberation with parties involved in the conflict, the Jirga members concluded that from the top of the mountain, the people of Hunza should exercise collective rights on their side while the Nagar side will belong to them and none will intervene on the other side. This decision was unanimously accepted by both parties and the conflict was resolved amicably (Batool, 2024). This settlement of the dispute saved many villagers from both sides who were practically involved in occupying the common lands. It also reiterated the rights of the community over common land and saved them from exploitation in a few hands.

2. Inheritance case: Sarwar v/s Brothers 

An issue over inheritance occurred when a father deprived one son out of five children for being out of the home for many years. His elder son Sarwar had left home for Karachi and remained there for many years. But before the demise of his father, he returned to home and found that his father had divided his property among his three brothers and one sister. He requested his father to give him his share but his father refused and meanwhile he passed away. After his demise, Sarwar approached to his brothers for his share but in vain. Eventually, he lodged a petition at a court of law for his inheritance and resultantly his brothers and sister were asked to appear before the court. The judge asked them to produce any written will of their father and eventually, they produced a written paper as well. Sarwar’s case was dismissed and he returned home empty-handed. He approached his village council for review and to address his grievances. The village council also failed to get his part of the inheritance and Sarwar became frustrated. He was not satisfied with the decisions of the court and village council. Finally, he approached a prominent Jirgadar of his village known as Baitham. He was best known for his conciliatory tasks in the village. Baitham called brothers and sisters of Sarwar and convinced them to give some part of their inheritance to their brother. They were convinced by the mediation of Baitham and eventually agreed to share with their brother. It was neither the court of law nor the council of the village but Baitham was a single person who convinced erstwhile stubborn siblings of Sarwar to give him his due right (Baitham, 2024). The role played by Baitham shows that in conflict resolution, mediator/s play a vital role in convincing the conflicting parties. Understanding emotions on both sides and hitting the hammer at the right time saves many from losses. 

3. Sectarian Case: Shia v/s Sunni 

Sectarian clashes between Shia and Sunni have erupted in many parts of GB. However, Napura Valley in the Gilgit district is known to suffer badly during the 2009-2011 clashes. People from both sects are relatives of each other. But the sectarian divide has deep-rooted and Research Journal of Human and Social Aspects 26 divided the same people for many years. Youth from both sides involved in clashes and mourning families easily identified their culprits. So the sectarian clashes prolonged and families started taking revenge by targeting their enemies. Cases were registered and proceedings were carried out at a court of laws but without imminent resolutions. The captives were also under threat when brought before the court for hearings. Opponents may attack within the premises of the courts. The state almost failed to resolve the conflict and to give security assurance for jailed ones let alone other members of the family. The notable areas perceiving the potential of conflict resolved to mediate and settle the issue once and for all. Among them Numardar Haji Mir Wali, Ex. Dy. Speaker GB Assembly Jaffarullah, Zawar Mansoor Ali and Sheikh Bashir Hussain were the prominent elders who took responsibility for conflict resolution. They approached the aggrieved families and got their consent to resolve their enmity. After prolonged deliberations with all affected families, they were able to reach a satisfying conclusion that the cases in courts of law should be withdrawn and the government should compensate blood loss of each murder. The conflicting families agreed to forgive their blood for the sake of peace and they embraced their enemies. Eventually, the Jirga notables were able to settle the conflict satisfying all affected families (Ahmed, 2023). It shows that even larger violent conflicts between sects can be resolved by indigenous mechanisms and this sort of resolution extends restorative justice to conflicting parties apart from saving them mental suffering, security threats, financial implications and prolonged court cases

4. Water dispute: Shayar v/s Sumayar

 Although water is in abundance in GB, irrigation water fell short in times of peak demand. It is a case of two valleys: Shayar and Sumayar in the District Nagar of GB. Sumayar is a riparian valley while Shayar is situated downwards. The irrigation water channel is the same for both villages and the flow of water does not suffice with day by day increasing demand. It gave vent to conflict between villages when the people of Sumayar reduced the flow of water to downward Shahyar in harvesting seasons. Both villages claimed the water channel in their own right and consequently conflict escalated. Governmental authorities intervened and dispersed the fighting youth but could not resolve the issue permanently. Considering the potential threat of violent clashes between two villages, elders from both sides decided to mediate the conflict and to reach any viable solution. After prolonged deliberations, it was decided that the water from the channel should be given to Shayar for four days a week and Sumayar will receive water for three days. It was injustice with Sumayar valley but in fact, cultivated land was larger in Shayar (Ali, 2023). Therefore, keeping in view the actual water demand, the Jirga decided to divide days between two valleys. Initially, the people of Sumayar were reluctant to accept this decision but later on, convinced by the Jirga elders. The issue was permanently resolved and threats of clashes were avoided permanently. It shows that the indigenous wisdom works at best and people obliged with their elders. Therefore conflict resolution at the local level by elders seems to be a permanent and long-lasting solution without intriguing complexities of formal resolution mechanisms. 

Conclusion 

Gilgit-Baltistan is a frontier region governed under traditional laws and colonial structures of English law with a sharp influence on Islamic traditions. Three sources of laws simultaneously shape the existing conflict resolution mechanism in the region. Indigenous traditional Jirga system has been effective in the resolution of disputes arising out of family inheritance, natural resource distribution and ethno-sectarian conflicts. Cases of a criminal and civil nature have been amicably resolved by local jirgas and hence there is a need to protect and encourage this local mechanism for conflict resolution to save courts from being overburdened with litigations. The Federal Muhtasib needs to establish its regional offices in Gilgit and Research Journal of Human and Social Aspects 27 Baltistan to give institutional shelter and recognition and encouragement to local elders for their volunteer services in conflict resolution.

Bibliography 

Ahmed, N. (2023, December 16). Sectarian Hostilities at Napura. (Jirgadars, Interviewer) Aiyedun, A. (2020). Integrating the traditional with the contemporary in dispute resolution in Africa. Law and Democracy and Development. Ali, M. (2023, December 21). Water dispute. (Jirgadars, Interviewer) Baitham. (2024, December 14). Inheritance issue. (M. Awais, Interviewer) Batool, R. (2024, December 28). Domdass Dispute. (Jirga, Interviewer) Cornell. (2024, April Friday ). Legal Information Institute. Retrieved April 12, 2024, from Cornell Law School: https://www.law.cornell.edu/lii/about/contact_us Karishma , Adeela Rehman , Hina Arooj , Nadia Bakhtawar. (2021). PERCEPTION AND PRACTICES OF YOUTH TOWARDS CROSSSECT MARRIAGES IN GILGIT BALTISTAN. PalArch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/ Egyptology. Khan, M. A. (2023, January 16). Khalsa Land Issue in GB. The Nation. Ombudsmen. (2013). Informal Dispute Resolution (IRD). Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat, Islamabad. Islamabad, Pakistan: Wafaqi Mohtasib